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plied "People are not so stupid not to know that to vote against a democratic
ticket is to vote indirectly against me".
He spoke of the loss of prestige he would have not only in Congress but in
Europe. He said their first impression over there would be that he had been de-
feated, and although the later returns would indicate otherwise, in the general
disturbed conditions they would have time only to get a first impression. He
seemed thoroughly weary and heartsick, and it took my best endeavors to put him
in a better frame of mind. I told him I was much comforted in the returns; the
West had supported him beyond our expectations, and for the first time we had
run up against a practically solid republican party.
We then took up the Belgian relief plan. I read him a cablegram from
Page which was address to "The Secretary of State and Colonel House". He au-
thorized me to carry out the suggestions made by Page.
We passed then to the question of a reserve army. He baulked somewhat at
first and said he thought the labor people would object because they felt that a
large army was against their interests. He did not believe there was any neces-
sity for immediate action, he was afraid it would shock the country. He made the
statement that no matter how <del/> the great war ended, there would be com-
plete exhaustion, and, even if Germany won, she would not be in a condition to
seriously menace our country for many years to come. I combatted this idea,
stating that Germany would have a large military force ready to act in furthering
the designs which the military party evidently have in mind. He said she would
not have the men. I replied that she could not win unless she had at least two
or three million men under arms at the end. He evidently thought the available
men would be completely wiped out.
I insisted it was time to do a great constructive work for the army and
one which would make the country too powerful for any nations to think of at-
tacking us. He told me there was reason to suspect that the Germans had laid
throughout the country concrete foundations for great guns similar to those they
| Title | ms_0466_s2_v2_211 |
| Transcript |
plied "People are not so stupid not to know that to vote against a democratic
ticket is to vote indirectly against me".
He spoke of the loss of prestige he would have not only in Congress but in
Europe. He said their first impression over there would be that he had been de-
feated, and although the later returns would indicate otherwise, in the general
disturbed conditions they would have time only to get a first impression. He
seemed thoroughly weary and heartsick, and it took my best endeavors to put him
in a better frame of mind. I told him I was much comforted in the returns; the
West had supported him beyond our expectations, and for the first time we had
run up against a practically solid republican party.
We then took up the Belgian relief plan. I read him a cablegram from
Page which was address to "The Secretary of State and Colonel House". He au-
thorized me to carry out the suggestions made by Page.
We passed then to the question of a reserve army. He baulked somewhat at
first and said he thought the labor people would object because they felt that a
large army was against their interests. He did not believe there was any neces-
sity for immediate action, he was afraid it would shock the country. He made the
statement that no matter how |
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