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contrary. His argument was that if we were in the war we could at any time say
to the Allies we were ready to make a separate peace with Germany, naming condi-
tions upon which we would treat. This, I thought, impracticable. If once in,
in my opinion, we would have to remain until all sides were exhausted, or a decis-
ive defeat has been brought about. I argued the matter earnestly and convinced
him that for the good of all it would be best for us to smooth over the Lusitania
incident, and intervene by demanding a conference of the belligerents for the
purpose of discussing peace terms.
We finally agreed it was best for the President not to set any condi-
tions whatever, but <del/> merely <add>to</add> demand that war cease, and a conference be held.
We decided to take into our confidence, Asquith, Balfour, Lloyd George and Reading.
It was further decided that I should make the initial talk tomorrow when the Prime
Minister, Balfour and myself meet at Grey's for lunch. Page, Lloyd George and
Reading are to be brought into the discussion at Lord Reading's dinner Monday
night.
Grey wondered whether it would not be best for Great Britain to give up her
blockade. I thought not unless Germany would consent to a more humane warfare
both undersea and overhead.
Before Grey consented to having the President intervene, I laid bare the
plight of the Allies and the possibilities of defeat, particularly the possibility
of Great Britain finding herself alone in the contest. He was interested in what
I told him of my interview with Briand and Cambon, and expressed gratitude that
I had taken the matter up with them direct so as to relieve his Government of
the suspicion of being the one desiring peace. That, he felt, was the point
to be guarded. If the Allies thought Great Britain was preparing to discuss
peace, something like a panic might ensue.
I outlined the general feeling among the Allies regarding Great Britain.
Russia, I told him, was dissatisfied, Italy, I knew, to be and France would pro-
| Title | ms_0466_s2_v4_060 |
| Transcript |
contrary. His argument was that if we were in the war we could at any time say
to the Allies we were ready to make a separate peace with Germany, naming condi-
tions upon which we would treat. This, I thought, impracticable. If once in,
in my opinion, we would have to remain until all sides were exhausted, or a decis-
ive defeat has been brought about. I argued the matter earnestly and convinced
him that for the good of all it would be best for us to smooth over the Lusitania
incident, and intervene by demanding a conference of the belligerents for the
purpose of discussing peace terms.
We finally agreed it was best for the President not to set any condi-
tions whatever, but |
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