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ence with European affairs.
Lloyd George was inclined to insist that we reach an agreement as to
terms of peace before it was agreed that the President should intervene. I
discouraged this view. Asquith again asked what the President would do in
the event he presided at the peace conference, and the Allies proposed a set-
tlement which he considered unjust. I replied that he would probably withdraw
from the conference and leave them to their own devices. On the other hand,
he wished to know what the President would do in the event Germany proposed
something totally unfair, and against the interest of civilization and humanity.
In these circumstances, I thought the President would throw the weight of the
United States on the side of the Allies. In other words, he would throw the
weight of the United States on the side of those wanting a just settlement--a
settlement which would make another such war impossible, and which would look
to the advancement of civilization and the comity of nations.
Lloyd George brought me to my hotel in his motor, and we had a few
moments of conversation alone.
February 15, 1916.
I called at 33 Eccleston Square this morning at 10.30 in order to
see Grey for a moment, before going to Buckingham Palace where I was to meet
the King at eleven o'clock.
Sir Edward was visibly pleased with the result of our meeting last night.
He congratulated me upon committing Lloyd George so thoroughly to the proposi-
tion of intervention by the President. He said he did not wish to do this
himself, and he was wondering how it was possible to bring it about. It was
his opinion, the British Government had not faced so momentous a decision as
the one I had asked for, since July 1914 when the question of war or peace was
before them. He showed considerable emotion, walking up and down the room
| Title | ms_0466_s2_v4_074 |
| Transcript | ence with European affairs. Lloyd George was inclined to insist that we reach an agreement as to terms of peace before it was agreed that the President should intervene. I discouraged this view. Asquith again asked what the President would do in the event he presided at the peace conference, and the Allies proposed a set- tlement which he considered unjust. I replied that he would probably withdraw from the conference and leave them to their own devices. On the other hand, he wished to know what the President would do in the event Germany proposed something totally unfair, and against the interest of civilization and humanity. In these circumstances, I thought the President would throw the weight of the United States on the side of the Allies. In other words, he would throw the weight of the United States on the side of those wanting a just settlement--a settlement which would make another such war impossible, and which would look to the advancement of civilization and the comity of nations. Lloyd George brought me to my hotel in his motor, and we had a few moments of conversation alone. February 15, 1916. I called at 33 Eccleston Square this morning at 10.30 in order to see Grey for a moment, before going to Buckingham Palace where I was to meet the King at eleven o'clock. Sir Edward was visibly pleased with the result of our meeting last night. He congratulated me upon committing Lloyd George so thoroughly to the proposi- tion of intervention by the President. He said he did not wish to do this himself, and he was wondering how it was possible to bring it about. It was his opinion, the British Government had not faced so momentous a decision as the one I had asked for, since July 1914 when the question of war or peace was before them. He showed considerable emotion, walking up and down the room |
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