ms_0466_s2_v5_248 |
Previous | 248 of 430 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
|
ten minutes with the Ambassador. He denied absolutely that he had talked to
Lansing differently from what he had to me, and told Colcord that his views were
the same as mine. When he was here on Sunday, I advised him to cable his Govern-
ment asking them to instruct the Russian Ambassador in each of the Allied countries
to warn the governments to which they are accredited of the effect an abrupt ans-
wer would have in Russia. I outlined the kind of message I hoped the Russian
Foreign Secretary would think it well to send. The Ambassador sent work by Col-
cord that he had cabled his Government as I had suggested.
On Sunday, Bakhmetieff talked of the Japanese question. He felt the
Japanese Mission had come for the purpose of pressing their demands upon the
Government of the United States at this critical time. He thought these demands
would embrace the Chinese question and the German possessions in the Pacific, taken
over by the Japanese. I thought they might have these things in mind, but I
also thought they had questions like the embargo on steel, the land question, the
question of immigration and other long-standing grievances. Bakhmetieff felt
the Japanese Government was not to be trusted and we agreed that if Russia had
remained an autocracy, Russia and Japan would have exploited China between them
regardless of the balance of the world, and perhaps they would have made a coal-
ition with the Central Powers.
Colcord wished to return to Boston and see the Ambassador before he left
and ask him to give out a statement similar to the one made to me. I advised
against this. It would be unwise for an ambassador to do so and I do not want to
let him fall into trouble inadvertently. He has no diplomatic experience and
while an able man, is still new to his duties.
| Title | ms_0466_s2_v5_248 |
| Transcript | ten minutes with the Ambassador. He denied absolutely that he had talked to Lansing differently from what he had to me, and told Colcord that his views were the same as mine. When he was here on Sunday, I advised him to cable his Govern- ment asking them to instruct the Russian Ambassador in each of the Allied countries to warn the governments to which they are accredited of the effect an abrupt ans- wer would have in Russia. I outlined the kind of message I hoped the Russian Foreign Secretary would think it well to send. The Ambassador sent work by Col- cord that he had cabled his Government as I had suggested. On Sunday, Bakhmetieff talked of the Japanese question. He felt the Japanese Mission had come for the purpose of pressing their demands upon the Government of the United States at this critical time. He thought these demands would embrace the Chinese question and the German possessions in the Pacific, taken over by the Japanese. I thought they might have these things in mind, but I also thought they had questions like the embargo on steel, the land question, the question of immigration and other long-standing grievances. Bakhmetieff felt the Japanese Government was not to be trusted and we agreed that if Russia had remained an autocracy, Russia and Japan would have exploited China between them regardless of the balance of the world, and perhaps they would have made a coal- ition with the Central Powers. Colcord wished to return to Boston and see the Ambassador before he left and ask him to give out a statement similar to the one made to me. I advised against this. It would be unwise for an ambassador to do so and I do not want to let him fall into trouble inadvertently. He has no diplomatic experience and while an able man, is still new to his duties. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| B |
|
| C |
|
| G |
|
| H |
|
| M |
|
| T |
|
| U |
|
| Y |
|
|
|
