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2oo CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS.
forbade our launching into much extra expense for objects
which were remote and contingent. This determination
having taken place, all the northern preparations were
discontinued, except such as were necessary towards the
intended Indian expedition.
Things were in this situation when I received a letter
from General Bailey (living at Co-os), expressing some fears
for the safety of the magazine at Co-os ; in consequence of
which I directed the stores to be removed lower down the
country. This I did to prevent the possibility of accident,
though I did not apprehend they were in much danger.
Sometime afterward I received the letter (No. i) from
General Gates, expressing similar fears, to which I returned
him the answer of 14th February, transmitted by him to
Congress (No. 2). Knowing that preparations had been
making at Albany, and unacquainted with their true design,
he inferred, from a vague expression in that letter, that the
intention of attacking Canada was still adhered to, but that
I had changed the plan, and was going by way of Lake
Champlain or Ontario : either of these routes he pronounces
impracticable, and represents that by Co-os as the only practicable one. He goes further, and declares, that " in the
present state of our army, and the actual situation of our
magazines, to attempt a serious invasion of Canada by
whatever route, would prove unsuccessful, unless the fleet
of our allies should at the same time co-operate with us, by
sailing up the river St. Lawrence." Though I differ with
him as to the impracticability of both the other routes, I
venture to go a step beyond him respecting our ability to
invade Canada; and am convinced, that in our present
circumstances, and with the enemy in front, we cannot
undertake a serious invasion of that country at all, even
with the aid of an allied fleet.
You will perceive, sir, that I have uniformly made the
departure of the enemy from these States an essential con-
| Title | The correspondence and public papers of John Jay - 1 |
| Creator | Jay, John |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Title | 00000231 |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Transcript | 2oo CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS. forbade our launching into much extra expense for objects which were remote and contingent. This determination having taken place, all the northern preparations were discontinued, except such as were necessary towards the intended Indian expedition. Things were in this situation when I received a letter from General Bailey (living at Co-os), expressing some fears for the safety of the magazine at Co-os ; in consequence of which I directed the stores to be removed lower down the country. This I did to prevent the possibility of accident, though I did not apprehend they were in much danger. Sometime afterward I received the letter (No. i) from General Gates, expressing similar fears, to which I returned him the answer of 14th February, transmitted by him to Congress (No. 2). Knowing that preparations had been making at Albany, and unacquainted with their true design, he inferred, from a vague expression in that letter, that the intention of attacking Canada was still adhered to, but that I had changed the plan, and was going by way of Lake Champlain or Ontario : either of these routes he pronounces impracticable, and represents that by Co-os as the only practicable one. He goes further, and declares, that " in the present state of our army, and the actual situation of our magazines, to attempt a serious invasion of Canada by whatever route, would prove unsuccessful, unless the fleet of our allies should at the same time co-operate with us, by sailing up the river St. Lawrence." Though I differ with him as to the impracticability of both the other routes, I venture to go a step beyond him respecting our ability to invade Canada; and am convinced, that in our present circumstances, and with the enemy in front, we cannot undertake a serious invasion of that country at all, even with the aid of an allied fleet. You will perceive, sir, that I have uniformly made the departure of the enemy from these States an essential con- |
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