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BOMBARDMENT OF FORT McIIENRY. 115
" Such was our situation, both of body and mind, from midnight, when the ships
"began to open fire, up to the hour of two. That all things went not prosperously, was
manifest enough.
" At last Colonel Brooke having waited until he considered it imprudent to wait
longer, without knowing the disposition of the fleet, and whether he was to be supported,
he determined if possible to open a communication with the fleet, and for that purpose
despatched an officer to make an effort to reach it. After many adventures, he arrived on
the river bank just in time to meet a party who had been sent by Admiral Cochrane, for
the same purpose, to Colonel Brooke. By them he was conveyed to the Admiral, who
informed him " that no effectual support could be given to the land force; for such was the
shallowness of the river, that none except the very lightest craft could make their way
within six miles of the town ; and even these were stopped by vessels sunk in the channel,
and other artificial bars, barely within a shell's longest range of the fort. With this
unwelcome news, he was accordingly forced to return. * * * *
" Having brought his report to headquarters, a council of war was instantly summoned
to deliberate upon what was best to be done. Without the help of the fleet, it was evident,
that adopt what plan of attack we could, our loss must be such as to counterbalance even
success itself; while success, under existing circumstances, was, to say the least of it,
doubtful. And even if we should succeed, what would be gained by it ? We could not
" remove anything from Baltimore, for want of proper conveyances. Had the ships been
able to reach the town, then, indeed, the quantity of booty might have repaid the survivors
for their toil, and consoled them for the loss of comrades; but as the case now stood, we
should only fight to give us an opportunity of re-acting the scenes of Washington About three hours after midnight, the troops were accordingly formed
upon the road, and began their retreat, leaving the pickets to deceive the enemy and to
follow as a rear guard."1
If General Ross had lived, it is possible, and indeed probable, that he
might have attempted to force the entrenchments, or pass around them, with
a view of approaching the city upon a quarter where the natural advantages of the ground were not as great. But the experienced eye of General
Smith had contemplated both these probabilities and provided against
them. The heavy artillery which was planted in batteries manned by
brave and skillful artillerymen, and the numerous corps of infantry which
lined the entrenchments would have rendered the first a fruitless effort
whether made by day or night. If by day, the destruction of the assailing
force would have been almost certain, and ample means were provided if
the attack had been made by night, to throw upon the advancing column
such a blaze of light, that the* aim of the defenders would have been
unerring. No direct attack could have succeeded. If, on the other hand,
a circuitous route had been taken, the advantages of a knowledge of the
country and of numbers would have probably turned the scale in favor of
the American troops, a part of which had shown on the day before, that
they could meet the invaders in the field with a gallantry well adapted
to inspire caution in an enemy.
It seems, however, that the enemy did make a feint to pass around the
entrenchments, for General Smith, in his official report to the secretary
of war, dated September 19th, 1814, says :
1 G:e'g, p. 196.
| Title | History of Maryland - 3 |
| Creator | Scharf, J. Thomas (John Thomas) |
| Publisher | J. B. Piet |
| Place of Publication | Baltimore |
| Date | 1879 |
| Language | eng |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Title | 00000142 |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Transcript | BOMBARDMENT OF FORT McIIENRY. 115 " Such was our situation, both of body and mind, from midnight, when the ships "began to open fire, up to the hour of two. That all things went not prosperously, was manifest enough. " At last Colonel Brooke having waited until he considered it imprudent to wait longer, without knowing the disposition of the fleet, and whether he was to be supported, he determined if possible to open a communication with the fleet, and for that purpose despatched an officer to make an effort to reach it. After many adventures, he arrived on the river bank just in time to meet a party who had been sent by Admiral Cochrane, for the same purpose, to Colonel Brooke. By them he was conveyed to the Admiral, who informed him " that no effectual support could be given to the land force; for such was the shallowness of the river, that none except the very lightest craft could make their way within six miles of the town ; and even these were stopped by vessels sunk in the channel, and other artificial bars, barely within a shell's longest range of the fort. With this unwelcome news, he was accordingly forced to return. * * * * " Having brought his report to headquarters, a council of war was instantly summoned to deliberate upon what was best to be done. Without the help of the fleet, it was evident, that adopt what plan of attack we could, our loss must be such as to counterbalance even success itself; while success, under existing circumstances, was, to say the least of it, doubtful. And even if we should succeed, what would be gained by it ? We could not " remove anything from Baltimore, for want of proper conveyances. Had the ships been able to reach the town, then, indeed, the quantity of booty might have repaid the survivors for their toil, and consoled them for the loss of comrades; but as the case now stood, we should only fight to give us an opportunity of re-acting the scenes of Washington About three hours after midnight, the troops were accordingly formed upon the road, and began their retreat, leaving the pickets to deceive the enemy and to follow as a rear guard."1 If General Ross had lived, it is possible, and indeed probable, that he might have attempted to force the entrenchments, or pass around them, with a view of approaching the city upon a quarter where the natural advantages of the ground were not as great. But the experienced eye of General Smith had contemplated both these probabilities and provided against them. The heavy artillery which was planted in batteries manned by brave and skillful artillerymen, and the numerous corps of infantry which lined the entrenchments would have rendered the first a fruitless effort whether made by day or night. If by day, the destruction of the assailing force would have been almost certain, and ample means were provided if the attack had been made by night, to throw upon the advancing column such a blaze of light, that the* aim of the defenders would have been unerring. No direct attack could have succeeded. If, on the other hand, a circuitous route had been taken, the advantages of a knowledge of the country and of numbers would have probably turned the scale in favor of the American troops, a part of which had shown on the day before, that they could meet the invaders in the field with a gallantry well adapted to inspire caution in an enemy. It seems, however, that the enemy did make a feint to pass around the entrenchments, for General Smith, in his official report to the secretary of war, dated September 19th, 1814, says : 1 G:e'g, p. 196. |
