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Introduction xxiii
of these more than 80,000 are said to have found
their graves in Cuba. The revolutionary forces were
always much smaller than their antagonists, as well as
inferior in arms and equipments ; besides which, the
Spanish navy controlled the water. The only prudent strategy for the insurgents was the Fabian kind
that avoids pitched battles, a tedious policy, but apt
to be highly effective in the long run. What the
Cubans accomplished by such methods and by guerilla warfare was extremely encouraging. The net
result of the Ten Years' War afforded good ground
for the opinion that they might try the experiment
of revolution once more with strong hopes of success.
That they would try it again could hardly be doubtful. The capitulation of El Zanjon was achieved
only through the understanding that abuses were to
be reformed. The first article of the document implicitly concedes to Cubans representation in the
Cortes at Madrid. From such a concession further
reforms were expected to follow. It was clear
enough that nothing short of effective reform could
prevent the renewal of revolution. No such reform
was secured. As far as representation at Madrid
was concerned, that was soon rendered a nullity by
the Peninsulars contriving to get control of the polls
and prevent the election of any but their own men.
It is said that of the 30 deputies chosen in 1896,
all but four were natives of Spain. Bearing this
in mind, let us note some other features of political
reform, as conceived by the Spanish mind. The
power of the captain general had been absolute. In
1895 an attempt was made to limit it by providing
| Title | Marching with Gomez |
| Creator | Flint, Grover |
| Publisher | Lamson, Wolffe and company |
| Place of Publication | Boston, New York [etc.] |
| Date | 1898 |
| Language | eng |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Title | 00000028 |
| Type | Books/Pamphlets |
| Transcript | Introduction xxiii of these more than 80,000 are said to have found their graves in Cuba. The revolutionary forces were always much smaller than their antagonists, as well as inferior in arms and equipments ; besides which, the Spanish navy controlled the water. The only prudent strategy for the insurgents was the Fabian kind that avoids pitched battles, a tedious policy, but apt to be highly effective in the long run. What the Cubans accomplished by such methods and by guerilla warfare was extremely encouraging. The net result of the Ten Years' War afforded good ground for the opinion that they might try the experiment of revolution once more with strong hopes of success. That they would try it again could hardly be doubtful. The capitulation of El Zanjon was achieved only through the understanding that abuses were to be reformed. The first article of the document implicitly concedes to Cubans representation in the Cortes at Madrid. From such a concession further reforms were expected to follow. It was clear enough that nothing short of effective reform could prevent the renewal of revolution. No such reform was secured. As far as representation at Madrid was concerned, that was soon rendered a nullity by the Peninsulars contriving to get control of the polls and prevent the election of any but their own men. It is said that of the 30 deputies chosen in 1896, all but four were natives of Spain. Bearing this in mind, let us note some other features of political reform, as conceived by the Spanish mind. The power of the captain general had been absolute. In 1895 an attempt was made to limit it by providing |
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